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This paper examines the factors that influence roll call voting abstention in the United 
States House of Representatives.  I control for factors both at the individual level and the 
institutional level. My data set includes all members of the House of Representatives from the 
102
nd
 (1991-1992) through the 107
th
 (2001-2002) sessions of Congress.  It is my intention to 
contribute to our scholarly understanding of abstention behavior in the United States House of 
Representatives and to help future research on Congressional roll call voting behavior.  I find 
strong empirical support for individual level effects, such as seniority, last of term of 
Congressional service, and ideology.  I also find support that institutional effects, such as party 







Since the early years of the discipline, Congressional roll call voting has long been of 
keen interest to political scientists.   In recent years, scholars have examined voting behavior as a 
measure of ideology (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997), as a measure of policy preferences (Krehbiel, 
1991), and as evidence of careerism (Hibbing, 1991).  However, the almost single-minded 
scholarly focus on the decision to support or oppose a measure has overlooked the first choice 
that a representative makes: the decision to vote or abstain.  As a practical matter, this first 
decision to participate can have consequences at least as important as those brought about by the 
Yea or Nay vote; moreover, understanding the decision to participate or abstain can contribute to 
our understanding of Congressional behavior overall.  If we as political scientists seek to explain 
turnout in the mass public, surely turnout in elite political institutions should also capture our 
attention.   
Abstention on roll call votes is a particularly interesting Congressional behavior to study 
because of the structure of our representative democracy. According to Federalist Paper Number 
10, the purpose of a representative democracy is "to refine and enlarge the public views, by 
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern 
the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to 
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen 
that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to 
the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose".  Article 
I, Section I of the United States Constitution states that "All Legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 





representation for the populous.  In principle, members of Congress should translate the desires 
of the populous by enacting legislation.  House members, representing their specific 
constituencies, are the most direct voice of the people. When they abstain, no matter how 
insignificant the outcome of the vote cast would be, it silences the voice of the people.  As Fenno 
notes, “It would be a tragedy if its representational strength goes unrecognized and unused 
because the very representatives who make it strong are afraid to acknowledge that strength or 
use it to help govern the country” (246-247).   High to moderate levels of abstention raise serious 
questions about the nature of our representative democracy.   
Despite the importance of the “to vote or not” choice, abstention behavior is an area in 
the Congressional roll call voting research that has not received adequate attention.  Abstention 
has either been ignored in the literature or assumed to be random. Noll points out that “unpaired 
abstentions are usually assumed to occur randomly, such as when a legislator misses a plane or is 
too ill to be wheeled to the floor on a gurney” (98).  Yet it is unlikely that abstention behavior is 
a stochastic one.  We know as political scientists that members of Congress have particular 
motivations regarding policy making and position taking, and so it is likely that this first decision 
to participate is similarly calculated, rational choice on the part of the member.  Nonetheless, the 
few authors that have studied abstention behavior (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal 1997, Fiorina 1974; 
Hibbing 1991) have produced mixed conclusions about the determinants and significance of 
abstention.   
 In this thesis, I address this gap in the literature by examining the factors that influence 
individual-level abstention on roll call voting. If roll call abstention is a calculated, rational 





party, and district distance from Washington as well as institutional level-characteristics such as 







As noted above, roll call abstention has been overlooked or dismissed as random in much 
of the research that examines it.  Nonetheless, a number of works that focus on general 
participation in Congress have examined a variety of factors that influence the choice to 
participate. 
Much of the prior literature on abstention behavior regards members of Congress as 
rational actors who are seeking re-election.  Mayhew (1957) describes reelection as the 
proximate goal of every member of the House.  It is the goal that must be attained before the 
member can pursue public policy goals.  “The ultimate concern here is not how probable it is that 
legislators will lose their seats but whether there is a connection between what they do in office 
and their need to be reelected” (1957).  Put differently, there is likely a connection between 
electoral “safety” in the district and behavior in Washington.   
Drawing on this idea, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) argue that that members of Congress 
are rational actors and, as such, choose to vote or to abstain based on their goal of maximizing 
utility.    The decision to vote or to abstain can be modeled with the familiar equation 
R = P(B) - C + D 
where R is the net reward from voting, B is the material benefit brought about by voting, P is the 
probability that one's vote will make a difference, C is the cost associated with voting, and D is 
the fixed benefit of voting. For instance, in the legislative setting B is the benefit brought about 
by the bill passing and P(B) is the expected utility of passage.  In the legislative setting the costs 
of voting might include missed opportunities to engage in other rewarding activities. In the 
legislature, as well as in the mass public, D may represent the satisfaction of exercising one's 






R = (P(B)) - (C + D)) > 0 
That is, members will abstain if and only if the benefits of abstention exceed the cost.  
If members of Congress are rational actors pursuing re-election, what factors should 
influence turnout?  Electoral margin is one such factor.  If members are rational seekers of re-
election, then members with a strong base or larger electoral margin will behave differently than 
those members from competitive districts.  Cohen and Noll (1991) find that the behavior of 
legislators is driven by the reelection motive rather than a consideration of playing a pivotal role 
on any one roll call.  They hypothesize that legislators view voting as costly because the time it 
requires could be used in providing constituency service or raising money for future campaigns. 
However, legislative outcomes influence constituents’ evaluations of their legislators, even when 
neither legislators nor voters vote instrumentally (1991, 123). In an analysis of roll call votes 
with high issue salience, they found that an issue is more likely to be salient to the constituency 
if they are dissatisfied with the legislative outcome.  In other words, legislators are more likely to 
abstain when there is little conflict between constituency preferences and legislative outcomes.  
When the constituency is satisfied by legislative performance, the member does not have 
increased incentives for high levels of participation.    
Seniority is another factor that likely influences the choice to participate. If we assume 
that members conceive of benefits and costs primarily in terms of their reelection prospects, it 
makes sense that seniority may be associated with changes in participation.  Fenno (1978) 
distinguished between freshman members and more senior members. He categorized members of 
the House into two different career stages:  expansionist and protectionist.  In the first, 





with re-election.  These members are likely to avoid any behavior (such as abstention) that could 
have an adverse effect on their re-election prospects.  As a member becomes more senior and 
develops a strong electoral base in their home district, he or she moves into the "protectionist" 
stage, where they enjoy more behavioral freedom.  In a quantitative study of roll call voting 
behavior of individual members from 1947 through 1982, Hibbing found that more senior 
members are less likely to participate in roll call votes (1991).  As Hibbing notes, this "decline in 
participation over the course of a career is not a particularly earth shattering finding" (1991).  On 
the other hand, Hibbing finds that "careerists" (or those who stay at least eight terms) have higher 
participation rates overall. 
Seniority may also have an influence at the end of one's career, when members are 
presumably less concerned with re-election.  Legislators who are leaving office (for retirement, 
running of higher office, or electoral defeat) will no longer have the incentive to present their 
electorate with a good voting record (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, 213).  They are more likely to 
“shirk” their duty to vote.  Nonetheless, Poole and Rosenthal find that lame duck members 
behave the same as other members, even after they distinguish between voluntary and non-
voluntary exits. 
Geographic distance from the member's home district to Washington DC is another factor 
that likely influences participation.  Fenno (1977) noted that a member of Congress has two 
separate careers, "one in the House and one at home" (171).  These careers are not independent 
of each other, and the time spent on one career is time which is spent away from the other.  
Drawing on this idea, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) examine the possibility that members who live 
further away from the nation's capital may be more likely to abstain.  They find that the effect of 





They offer two reasons for this.  First, it is possible that representatives who live close to 
Washington DC may actually find it easier to travel, and thus miss as many votes or more votes 
than those who are elected from distant districts.  Second, it is likely that improvements in 
passenger-transportation technology makes travel much easier and less time-consuming, and that 
the differences in travel time varies much less across representatives in the contemporary 
Congress than it did even half a century ago. 
The individual ideology of a member has also been shown to have an effect on roll call 
voting behavior.  Hibbing (1982) found evidence that “representatives with extreme ideological 
positions are more likely to retire voluntarily than are moderates”.  Poole and Rosenthal (1997) 
add that extreme ideological members may feel “alienated” from many roll call votes.  
Therefore, extreme ideologues were more likely to abstain because they are further spatially 
from the roll call vote itself.  It is reasonable to expect that more extreme members may be less 
supportive of their political party, and less likely to participate. 
According to John Aldrich, “political parties lie at the heart of American politics” (1995, 
3).  Partisanship is considered to be the most consistent predictor of roll call voting behavior.  
The balance of power between the two parties is also likely a key determinant of abstention.  The 
closer the division, the higher the likelihood that a vote would make a difference and the more 
incentive a legislator has to participate.  Poole and Rosenthal argue that "turnout should be 
higher when preferences on a roll call are evenly divided rather than being lopsided", because 





 sessions of the House that lopsided votes (votes that were not decided by a 
close margin) have higher abstention rates.  Poole and Rosenthal do not control for party 





Caldeira (1988) find that as the House becomes more polarized between Democrats and 
Republicans, the levels of party line voting increase.  It is reasonable to assume that the more 
polarized a House is the “closer” roll call votes will become.  Roll-call voting behavior in the 
House has become increasingly polarized in recent years; the 1990’s can be characterized by a 
strong, autonomous party government in the House (Dodd and Oppenheimer 1997).  This only 
increases the party’s need to influence their members’ roll call voting behavior.  Given this 
previous research, it makes intuitive sense that the balance of power across parties likely plays a 
role in abstention behavior; members of both the majority and minority party will be less likely 
to abstain when the majority party held an advantage of only a few seats.   
 This prior literature has made important contributions to our understanding of the choice 
legislators make to participate.  In this thesis, I contribute to this literature by modeling 
abstention behavior at the individual level, by focusing on the balance of power within the 
chamber, and by incorporating a wider range of explanatory variables.    Modeling abstention at 
the individual level will provide better understanding of Congressional participation and voting 







In this thesis, I test the following hypotheses: 
H1: Members who are ideologically extreme will abstain more than moderate members. 
 
H2: Abstention will increase with seniority. 
 
H3: Freshman members will be less likely to abstain than other representatives. 
 
H4: Individual members in their last term of service will be more likely to abstain than other 
members. 
 
H5: Electorally safe members will abstain more than those in relatively competitive districts. 
 
H6: Leaders will abstain more frequently than non-leaders. 
 
H7: Members who live farther from the capital will abstain more. 
 
H8: The more dominant the majority party is in terms of numerical balance, the less likely it 






DATA AND METHODS 
 
The data used in this research is compiled from three major sources: The Almanac of 
American Politics, the Poole and Rosenthal data set for Congress: A Political-Economic History 
of Roll Call Voting, and http://thomas.loc.gov/, the official website for the US Congress.  The 
sessions of Congress used in this analysis are the 102
nd
 thru the 107
th
.  This is an appropriate 
time period for this study, because party control and balance of power across the two parties 
varied across these six sessions.  The unit of analysis is the member of Congress; the dependent 
variable is the proportion of votes on which the legislator abstained. 
I have also included several independent variables explained more fully below: 
Ideological Extremism 
Democrats and Republicans are very ideologically diverse even within their own party 
caucuses.  As noted above, I hypothesized that ideological extremity is positively related to 
abstention.   Poole and Rosenthal D-Nominate scores are a common way to measure member 
ideology in Congress.  These scores range from -1 to 1, with -1 representing "very liberal" and 1 
representing "very conservative".  In this study, ideological extremity (EXTREME) is calculated 
the absolute value of the Poole and Rosenthal D-NOMINATE scores.  That is, the EXTREME 
variable measures how far a member is from a moderate ideological position.  I expect that 
higher values of EXTREME will be associated with a greater incidence of abstention. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Ideological Extremity  
Session Minimum Maximum Mean 
102 0 0.84 0.346 
103 0 0.84 0.3714 
104 0 0.95 0.416 
105 0.01 0.93 0.4233 
106 0.02 0.93 0.438 








Hibbing (1991) finds that member seniority has a major effect on roll call voting 
behavior.  As noted above, I expect that seniority will be positively related to abstention.  
Although not explicitly outlined by Hibbing, being a freshman may have an inverse effect, 
because freshman representatives may be particularly concerned with the expectations of their 
constituents and colleagues.  Therefore, as noted above, I expect that freshman members will be 
less likely to abstain.  Conversely, members may be more likely to abstain at the end of their 
service.  
I include three variables that are designed to measure seniority.  First, SENIOR is a 
variable that measures the length (in years) of continuous membership in the House.   Second, 
FRESHMAN is a dummy variable which is coded 1 if the representative is serving in his or her 
first session of the House, and 0 otherwise.  Third, I include as an independent variable a 
measure of whether a member was a "lame duck" or was serving in their last term in Congress.  
This variable (LAMEDUCK) is a dummy variable coded 1 if the member is in his/her final term 
of membership and 0 otherwise.
1
   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Seniority 
Session Minimum Maximum Mean 
102 1 51 11.92 
103 1 53 10.08 
104 2 41 9.59 
105 1 43 9.53 
106 1 45 10.16 





                                                 
1
 This variable does not distinguish among the reasons for becoming a lame duck.  While it is true that there are a 
variety of reasons why members of Congress leave the institution (illness, retirement, political ambition, legal 
troubles, or defeat), all of these factors would likely contribute to increased abstention. Therefore all members 





Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, First Term of Service 
Session Minimum Maximum Mean Total 
Freshman 
In Session 
102 0 1 0.1152 49 
103 0 1 0.2592 111 
104 0 1 0.212 91 
105 0 1 0.1793 77 
106 0 1 0.1011 43 
107 0 1 0.0972 41 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Last Term of Service 
Session Minimum Maximum Mean 
102 0 1 0.23 
103 0 1 0.183 
104 0 1 0.161 
105 0 1 0.092 
106 0 1 0.092 
107 0 1 0.144 
 
Electoral Safety 
According to Mayhew (1974), the primary goal of any member of Congress is to gain 
reelection.  During election years, an opponent can easily use the Congressional voting 
attendance record as a means of discrediting his or her opponent.  Therefore, as noted above, I 
expect that members who are electorally at risk are less likely to abstain than members holding 
relatively safe seats.  The variable MARGIN is the percentage of the vote that the member won 
in his/her district in the last election.  Members who were recently elected in a close race are 
likely to abstain less than other, safer members; and I expect MARGIN to be negatively related 













Table 5: Descriptive Statistics, Electoral Margin 
Session Minimum Maximum Mean 
102 43 100 68.99 
103 44 100 63.22 
104 43 100 66.15 
105 43 100 64.26 
106 48 100 70.47 
107 48 100 68.66 
 
Leadership Status 
In the U.S. House of Representatives, there are a variety of possible leadership positions, 
including party leader, committee leader, and subcommittee leader.  As noted above, the 
behavior of leaders may be different in important ways than the behavior of rank-and-file 
members.  Members who have these added responsibilities have more time constraints than the 
average rank and file member.  Members serving in the top leadership positions are expected to 
spend their time persuading rank and file members to support the party position, and committee 
and subcommittee chairs are expected to spend their time researching, writing, and amending 
legislation.  These commitments may cause the member to abstain more frequently.  For 
instance, the member with the highest rate of abstention in the 106th and 107th sessions of 
Congress was Denis Hastert, Speaker of the House.  To control for the effect of holding 
leadership positions within the House, I created 3 dummy variables: PLEAD, COMLEAD, and 
SUBLEAD. PLEAD is coded 1 if the member is in a party leadership position, 0 otherwise. 
COMLEAD is coded 1 if the member is a committee chair, 0 otherwise.  SUBLEAD is coded 1 
if the member is a subcommittee chair, 0 otherwise.   
Travel Distance to Washington, DC 
According to Fenno, members have two careers, “one in the House and one at home” 
(171).  Members from districts surrounding (or, in driving distance to) the Washington D.C. area 





with more frequent and quicker flights to and from DC, members who live farther away like face 
a completely different set of travel time constraints.  I therefore expect such members to abstain 
more frequently than members who live closer to Washington D.C.  To control for this I include 
a variable (DISTANCE) which measures the number of miles between the member’s state 
capital to Washington, DC.  I use the state capital as the comparison standard because I expect 
little behavioral difference between, for instance, the member in the 1
st
 district of Texas from the 
member representing the 22
nd
 district of Texas.  The maximum distance for a member to travel is 
3,806 miles (Alaska) and the shortest distance is 32.96 miles (Maryland).  The average value for 
DISTANCE is 1,087 miles with a standard deviation of 901 miles.  
In this thesis, I perform two sets of OLS analyses.  The first set of analyses are six cross 
sectional OLS analyses, one of each session Congress.  By analyzing each session separately, I 
can account for session specific effects.  Each cross sectional analysis will include all 
independent variables described above. 
As noted above, I hypothesized that the closer the difference between the majority and 
minority party is, the greater the incentive for both parties not to abstain.  In order to examine the 
effect of party balance on membership abstention behavior, I conduct an OLS regression analysis 
of all six sessions under consideration; that is, all six sessions are pooled.   Majority Party 
Dominance (PARTYDOM) is measured as the difference in percentage of seats between the 
majority and minority parties, and is expected to be positively associated with abstention.  












Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, Majority Party Dominance 
Session Democrats Republicans Percentage of Seats 
(majority party) 




102 267 167 61.4% 38.4% 23.0% 
103 258 176 59.3% 40.5% 18.9% 
104 204 230 52.9% 46.9% 6.0% 
105 206 228 52.4% 47.4% 5.1% 
106 211 223 51.3% 48.5% 2.8% 











Democrats 267 258 204 206 211 212
Republicans 167 176 230 228 223 221
102 103 104 105 106 107
 






Finally, because of the importance of party in structuring Congressional behavior and 
outcomes, I control for partisanship (coded 1 as Democrat, and 0 otherwise).  Poole and 
Rosenthal argued that majority party members would be more free to abstain from voting; 
therefore, in the pooled analysis, I also control for majority party status.  In Table 7, I present 
summary information regarding the measurement of the variables, and the direction of their 








Table 7: Variable Descriptions, Measurements, and Hypothesized Effects 
Variable Variable Description Coded Hypothesized Effect  
PERABS Total proportion of abstention Continuous Variable (dependent variable) 
    Proportion of times member abstained   
    on roll call votes that session    
PARTYDOM Measure of party dominance Continuous Variable  Positive 
    Difference between seats controlled by    
    majority party and minority party   
PARTY Partisanship of the member Dummy Variable Ambiguous 
    (1if Democrats, 0 otherwise)   
EXTREME Measure of ideology  Continuous Variable Positive 
    Absolute value of DNOM score   
LAMEDUCK Last term of service Dummy Variable Positive 
    (1if in last term of service, 0 otherwise)   
DISTANCE Distance to Washington Continuous Variable Ambiguous 
    Distance (in miles) from member's state    
    capital to Washington, DC   
SENIOR Measures the years served in  Continuous Variable Postive 
   Congress Length of service (in years)   
FRESHMAN First year members of  Dummy Variable Negative 
   Congress (1 for first term, 0 otherwise)   
PLEAD Member of party leadership Dummy Variable Positive 
    (1 if party leader, 0 otherwise)   
COMLEAD Committee Leader Dummy Variable Positive 
    (1 if committee leader, 0 otherwise)   
SUBLEAD Subcommitee Leader Dummy Variable Positive 
    (1 if subcommittee leader, 0 otherwise)   
MARGIN Percentage of electoral safety Continuous Variable Positive 
    
Percentage of votes won in previous 








First, I compare “high abstainers” to “low abstainers”.  High abstainers are defined as 
representatives who abstained on at least 10% of roll call votes. Low abstainers are defined as 
representatives who abstained on less than 4% of roll call votes.  Information regarding the 
electoral safety, ideological extremism, and status as “lame duck” representatives or as first year 
representatives is presented in Tables 8 and 9. 









Freshman Number of 
High 
Abstainers 
102 44.8% (30) 7.5% (5) 58.2% (39) 4.5% (3) 67 
103 57.1% (20) 5.7% (2) 40.0% (14) 11.4% (4) 35 
104 48.3% (14) 0% (0) 48.3% (14) 0% (0) 29 
105 54.2% (13) 0% (0) 41.7% (10) 0% (0) 24 
106 70.7% (29) 7.3% (3) 31.7% (13) 2.4% (1) 41 
107 67.2% (21) 0% (0) 41.9% (13) 0% (0) 31 
Total 55.8% (140) 4% (10) 45.0% (113) 3.2% (8) 251 
                 1
 Electoral margin in last election of at least 65% 
                 2 
For conservatives, dwnom ≥ .75; for liberals, dwnom ≤ -.75 
 









Freshman Number of 
Low 
Abstainers 
102 43.7% (97) 0.9% (2) 12.6% (28) 18.0% (40) 222 
103 31.1% (84) 0.7% (2) 14.4% (39) 31.9% (86) 270 
104 43.9% (136) 1.9% (6) 11.3% (35) 26.5 (82) 310 
105 29.7% (87) 2.0% (6) 6.5% (19) 22.9% (67) 293 
106 48.8% (120) 2.4% (6) 4.9% (12) 14.2% (35) 246 
107 44.2% (114) 4.7% (12) 8.9% (23) 14.3% (37) 258 
Total 38.3% (725) 2.1% (40) 9.2% (175) 21.9% (414)  
                 1
 Electoral margin in last election of at least 65% 
                 2 
For conservatives, dwnom ≥ .75; for liberals, dwnom ≤ -.75 
 
It is clear that abstention is not commonplace; nonetheless, many legislators miss at least 
ten percent of all roll call votes.  The information presented in these tables provides preliminary 
support for several of my hypotheses.  Recall that in H1, I hypothesized that members who are 
ideologically extreme will abstain more than moderate members. The results here are somewhat 





made up only slightly more of the high abstainers (3.42%).   My second hypothesis, that 
electorally safe members would abstain more, is supported.  On average, 57% of high abstainers 
were from electorally safe districts compared to 40.23% of low abstainers were from safe 
districts.  
The comparison between low and high abstainers suggests that the amount of abstention 
depends in large part on seniority.  In H3, I hypothesized that freshman members will be less 
likely to abstain than other members.  Across all sessions, freshman members made up only 3% 
of the high abstainers groups, but 21% of the low abstainer groups.  The strongest support was 
found for the fourth hypothesis, that individual members in their last term of service will be more 
likely to abstain than other members. Only 9.7% of low abstainers were in their last terms of 
service, compared to 43% of high abstainers. Clearly, the high abstainers were substantially more 
likely to be serving in their last session.   
The results in these preliminary analyses indicate that there are some individual level 
characteristic variations that have an impact on levels of abstention.  However, one of the 
contributions of this thesis is to consider the effect of each variable while controlling for all the 
others.  Therefore, I perform six cross-sectional OLS analyses, followed by a pooled OLS 
analysis.  In Table 10, the results of the six cross-sectional OLS analyses are presented and in 





Table 10: Influences on Abstention, 102nd through 107th Sessions 
Variable     Session       
  102 103 104 105 106 107 
(Constant) -0.002 -0.041** -0.019 -0.024* 0.004 0.005 
 {-0.152} {-2.865} {-1.559} {-1.860} {.248} {.470} 
Partisanship 0.016** 0.007 0.021*** 0.009** 0.006 0.002 
     (PARTY) {2.858} {1.538} {5.448} {2.198} {1.130} {.473} 
Ideological Extremity 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.019* 0.031** 0.049** 0.031** 
     (EXTREME) {3.648} {4.295} {1.669} {2.291} {2.806} {2.569} 
Last term of service 0.049*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.0217*** 0.064*** 0.028*** 
     (LAMEDUCK) {7.683} {6.564} {5.901} {3.084} {6.715} {5.306} 
Distance to DC¹ 0.005* -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
     (DISTANCE) {1.668} {-0.635} {.947} {1.240} {-.627} {-.445} 
Seniority 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
     (SENIOR) {1.903} {3.29} {4.085} {5.645} {2.412} {3.543} 
First term of service -0.012 -0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.011 -0.012* 
     (FRESHMAN) {-1.219} {-0.53} {.088} {.384} {-1.077} {-1.650} 
Party leadership 0.0003 -0.003 0.001 -0.009 0.004 0.006 
     (PLEAD) {0.042} {-0.45} {.145} {-1.144} {.814} {1.091} 
Committee leadership -0.014 -0.003 -0.012 0.001 -0.018* -0.006 
     (COMLEAD) {-1.538} {-0.391} {-1.443} {.153} {-1.676} {-.813} 
Subcommittee leadership 0.003 -0.008 -0.002 -0.009** -0.002 -0.005 
     (SUBLEAD) {0.48} {-1.482} {-.517} {-2.111} {-.406} {-1.168} 
Electoral margin  0.0001 0.0007*** 0.0002* 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0002 
     (MARGIN) {0.468} {3.738} {1.809} {1.986} {.604} {1.055} 
r² 0.21 0.190 0.23 0.19 0.13 0.15 
adjusted r² 0.187 0.175 0.207 0.171 0.11 0.127 
Dependent Variable=PERABS 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.         
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01     
¹In thousands of miles      
 
The results indicate that, as hypothesized in H1, members who are ideologically extreme 
abstain more than moderate members, and that this result holds even when controlling for 
partisanship.  Seniority also has the hypothesized effect on abstention:  more senior members 
tend to abstain more.  Moreover, even when controlling for seniority, members in their last term 
of service abstain more frequently than mid-career legislators; indeed, the standardized 
coefficients of the variables indicate that lame duck members are the most likely to abstain.  As 
hypothesized in H5, representatives elected from relatively safe district consistently abstain more 





   The third hypothesis, that freshman would be less likely to abstain, receives less support 
in these analyses.  It is only in the expected direction in four of the six sessions, and the 
parameter estimate reaches statistical significance only in the last (107
th
) session considered.  
Similarly, the sixth hypothesis receives at best mixed support; party leaders and committee 
leaders do not consistently abstain more often than non-leaders.  Subcommittee chairs do abstain 
more frequently than others, but the estimate is only significant in the last session analyzed.  
Finally, H7 received little support; distance from the nation’s capital has a significant effect in 
only one of the six sessions. 
 
In Table 11, the results of the pooled OLS analysis are presented. 
 
 
                     Table 11: Influences on Abstention, Pooled Sessions 
2
 
Variables Parameter Estimates 
(Constant) -0.018** 
 {-3.046} 
Majority Party Dominance 0.038*** 
     (PARTYDOM) {3.252} 
Partisanship 0.011*** 
     (PARTY) {4.961} 
Majority Party 0.0008 
     (MAJPARTY) {.422} 
Ideological Extremity  0.0413*** 
     (EXTREME) {7.342} 
Last Term of Service 0.036*** 
     (LAMEDUCK) {13.881} 
Distance to DC¹ .008 
     (DISTANCE) {.811} 
Seniority of Member 0.0014*** 
     (SENIOR) {8.674} 
First Term of service -0.007** 
     (FRESHMAN) {-2.320} 
Party Leader 0.001 
     (PLEAD) {.217} 
                                                 
2
 In an alternative analysis, I omitted the PARTYDOM variable and included five dummy variables to control for 





(Table 11 continued) 
Committee Leader -0.004 
     (COMLEAD) {-1.215} 
Subcommittee Leader -0.005** 
     (SUBLEAD) {-2.292} 
Electoral Margin  0.0003*** 
     (MARGIN) {4.020} 
r² 0.151 




NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 




 The results of the pooled analysis support most the hypotheses presented above.  
Extremists abstain more frequently than moderates.  More senior members abstain more 
frequently, and being in one’s last year of service has the most pronounced effect on abstention.  
Freshman are less likely to abstain than others.  Safe members are also more likely to abstain.  
Distance does not have a significant effect.  Contrary to expectations, subcommittee chairs are 
less likely to abstain.  The pooled analysis indicates that majority party dominance does have an 
effect on the degree of abstention; greater dominance between the parties leads to more 
abstention. 
Expected levels of abstention for hypothetical cases are presented in Table 12.  These 
expected levels underscore the importance of seniority in determining abstention.  While the 
differences across seniority levels is not enormous, it is clear that more senior members are more 
likely to abstain.  Moreover, ideological extremity appears important; moderate members appear 











Legislator in first year 0.065 
Legislator in fifth (but not last) year 0.077 
Legislator in tenth (but not last) year 0.083 
Legislator in tenth and last year 0.115 
Legislator in twentieth (but not last) 
year 0.092 
Legislator in twentieth and last year 0.128 
    
Legislator in Chamber where Parties 
are Balanced (party dominance=.02) 0.08 
Legislator in Chamber where Majority 
Party Dominates (party 
dominance=.23) 0.09 
    
Very Extreme Legislator (extreme=1) 0.066 






CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 





 Congress, I find that more extreme members are more likely 
to abstain; this reinforces Poole and Rosenthal’s findings from earlier Congresses.  Moreover, I 
find that this effect persists even when controlling for partisanship.  This finding is consistent 
with relatively extreme members feeling alienated from typical legislative proposals, and 
relatively moderate members having a higher stake in the process and outcome.  Moreover, like 
Hibbing, I find that seniority is associated with abstention; senior members abstain more 
frequently.   Like Poole and Rosenthal, I find that members in their last term are substantially 
more likely to abstain than other members; I contribute to prior literature by demonstrating that 
this effect holds even when controlling for seniority.  It is likely that, as Poole and Rosenthal 
reason, “lame duck” members feel less beholden to their constituencies, and are more free to 
“shirk”.  I also contribute to prior literature by demonstrating that first-year representatives are 
more likely to participate, even when controlling for overall seniority.  In previous literature, the 
seniority effect has been viewed as based in part on the electoral safety that senior incumbents 
often enjoy; however, in this analysis, the seniority effect remained quite large even after 
controlling for electoral margin.  Like earlier literature, I find little effect of distance from the 
nation’s capital.  As Poole and Rosenthal suggest, innovations in travel and communication may 
have erased the importance of distance. 
This thesis also contributes to prior literature in several additional ways.  First, I find that 
the numerical balance across the parties matters, even when controlling for majority party status 
and partisanship.  It is likely that minority members feel more compelled to participate when 





when there is a greater chance of defeat.  Second, I examine the effect of leadership; in the 
pooled analysis, contrary to expectations, subcommittee leaders were less likely to abstain.  
Much of the work of Congress takes place in these subcommittees; it is possible that these 
members are selected in part because of their productivity.  Moreover, they may serve as 
information specialists whose role is to give cues to other members; therefore their participation 
may be particularly important.  They may also be particularly heavily lobbied by interest groups 
and other outside parties.  More research should be done examining the role of leadership in 
participation.  Third, I find that Republicans are consistently less likely to abstain.  The reasoning 
for this is unclear; it is possible that Republicans built up norms during their years in the 
minority party, particularly in the early 1990s when it became clear that majority party status was 
within striking distance.   And fourth, I contribute to prior literature by examining the effect of 
margin; electorally safe members are more likely to abstain.  This finding is compatible with the 
rational choice argument that the decision to abstain is based in large part on a cost-benefit 
analysis.  If the primary goal of members of Congress is to be (re)elected, more electorally 
vulnerable members have more of an incentive to be productive. 
There are several promising avenues for future research.  First, more work should be 
done examining the distinct effects of partisanship and majority party status of the individual 
member, and party balance within the chamber.  More research should be done examining 
institutional-level effects, individual member effects, and individual roll-call effects.  Finally, 
more research should be done applying these theories of participation to participation defined 
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